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a b s t r a c t : A consensus has emerged among many normative theorists of cultural
pluralism that dialogue is the key to securing just relations among ethnic or cultural
groups. However, few normative theorists have explored the conditions or incentives
that enable inter-group dialogue versus those that encourage inter-group conflict. To
address this problem, I use Habermas’s distinction between communicative and
strategic action, since many models of inter-group dialogue implicitly rely upon
communicative action, while many accounts of inter-group conflict rest upon strategic
action. Drawing on explanatory accounts of inter-group conflict, I outline five
strategic logics of group conflict, what I call the resource, political, information,
positional, and security logics. I then argue that these strategic logics cannot be
overcome by three motivations commonly thought to support communicative action:
moral–cognitive consistency, the normative characteristics of modernity, and publicity
constraints. At this point, I turn to an empirical case, the reception of AfricanAmerican concerns within the Jewish public sphere prior to the Second World War,
in order to suggest that, although strategic incentives might hinder inter-group
dialogue, they may also encourage it. In conclusion, I provide three recommendations
for how theorists might utilize strategic incentives in order to recognize which actors,
policies, or institutions can encourage inter-group dialogue.
k e y w o r d s : cultural pluralism, ethnic conflict, Habermas, inter-group dialogue

A striking consensus is emerging among normative theorists of cultural pluralism.
Dialogue, it seems, is the key for securing just relations among ethnic or cultural
groups. Direct dialogue or mediated communicative processes among groups is a
central focus in works by Simone Chambers, Shane O’Neill, Bhikhu Parekh,
Charles Taylor, James Tully, and Iris Young.1 Even Will Kymlicka, whose liberal,
juridical theory of minority group rights is criticized for its apparent disregard for
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robust, discursive political participation, still concludes that relations among
groups must be conducted through dialogue.2 The apparent consensus is that
justice within plural societies requires political arrangements that result from
dialogues that take into account the varied cultural perspectives of the groups
involved.
Various concerns support the turn to dialogue. Arriving at substantive principles of justice among groups may well require a dialogical process whereby members of different groups come to understand their divergent perspectives and
beliefs. In turn, policies or rights based upon substantive principles of justice –
such as affirmative action, group-based representation, or group self-government
rights – often require a communicative process to specify their application or
revision, particularly if claims to such policies are contested.3 Alternatively, intergroup dialogue can mediate problems of cultural value conflict, in order to
mitigate the dilemma of either imposing one group’s cultural values upon another
or remaining in a culturally relativistic modus vivendi, wherein groups at best
tolerate but do not respect each other.4
But while good reasons support the connection between dialogue and justice
among groups, the weakness of this consensus lies in its purely normative focus.
Most proponents of dialogue assess only the moral validity of dialogue, without
clarifying the conditions that either enable or constrain it. This failure becomes
apparent when we consider that dialogue seems to presuppose a level of trust and
openness among groups, dispositions that are often disconfirmed by empirical
analysis, even when inter-group violence is absent. To the extent that such
empirical analyses are correct, groups will engage each other strategically, rather
than through the communicative processes that normative theorists favor.
Because normative theorists overlook the conditions of dialogue, they also
overlook how actors are constrained in their attempts to engage in this favored
practice.
In this article, I draw on explanatory accounts of group conflict and Jürgen
Habermas’s framework of strategic and communicative action, in order to investigate how strategic dynamics affect the possibility of inter-group dialogue. I use
Habermas’s analysis of communicative action rather than models more directly
concerned with inter-group dialogue for two reasons. First, most models of intergroup dialogue, while rejecting specific aspects of Habermas’s framework, nevertheless assume that actors adopt the orientation towards understanding depicted
by communicative action. Second, unlike most theorists of inter-group dialogue,
Habermas carefully distinguishes communicative action from the strategic action
assumed in empirical accounts of group conflict and cooperation. As a result, his
framework can better initiate an examination of the strategic logics that enable
and constrain inter-group dialogue.
In general, my argument supports three goals. Most broadly, I seek to clarify
the conditions that enable inter-group dialogue in a manner that is more finegrained than the accurate but vague appeals to communicative motivations com-
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mon among theorists of dialogue. More precisely, I try to clarify how strategic
logics constrain and enable different actors with respect to communicative orientations across group boundaries. Finally, I hope to prompt normative theorists to
think more strategically about which actors, policies, and institutional reforms can
foster inclusive dialogue and communication. My argument proceeds as follows.
First, I clarify the relationship between communicative action, strategic action,
and theories of inter-group dialogue. Second, I examine the strategic logics
underlying many explanatory accounts of group conflict and cooperation. Third,
I evaluate the motivations for communicative action in light of the strategic
logics of group interaction. Fourth, I draw on an empirical case to illustrate how
strategic dynamics can constrain or enable communicative action across group
boundaries. Finally, I suggest how political theorists might examine strategic
dynamics of group conflict in order to discern more clearly which political actors
and political institutions can best support inter-group dialogue.

Communicative Action and Inter-Group Dialogue
Habermas defines communicative action as the ‘interaction of at least two subjects
capable of speech and action who . . . seek to reach an understanding about their
action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by
way of agreement’.5 Understanding, in turn, is a product of raising criticizable
validity claims. This implies that understanding is not blind acceptance of every
utterance that a speaker proffers: rather, understanding assumes that the speaker
can provide reasons for the claims raised in speech. This orientation towards
understanding distinguishes communicative action from teleological or goaloriented action. Teleological action implies that actors are oriented not towards
understanding others but only to achieving their predetermined goals. Strategic
action is a subset of teleological action, whereby actors pursue their goals while
incorporating how others may react strategically to their actions. According to
Habermas, communicative action is intimately tied to teleological, goal-oriented
action: actors engage in communicative action to resolve conflicts and thereby
return to their pursuit of goals.6 However, communicative action expects actors to
suspend the pursuit of their goals in order to engage in communication aimed at
understanding. This distinction can be clarified in four further steps.
First, communicative action cannot be equated with communication per se.
Clearly, communication may be used strategically, as when rhetoric is used to
manipulate listeners to act in a certain way.7 While a communicative theorist like
Iris Young may defend rhetoric as a valid means for fostering inter-group communication,8 she uses rhetoric only to foster communicative understanding
among groups, not as a means for one group strategically to manipulate another.
Thus, while rhetoric departs from the rational argumentation portrayed in
Habermas’s theory of discourse, Young’s use of it remains within the broader
contours of communication oriented towards understanding. Habermas himself
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seems to recognize this point, when he notes that the ‘strategic elements within a
use of language can be distinguished from strategic actions through the fact that
the entire sequence of talk . . . stands under the presuppositions of communicative
action’.9 However, communicative action does bear a closer relationship to goaloriented action than some other forms of communication, such as everyday
banter or purely artistic communication pursued for its own sake. Communicative
action depicts how actors reach agreement on context definitions and norms that
allow them to resume the suspended pursuit of goals. We engage in communication to aid our goal-oriented action, not as an end in itself.
Second, while communicative action clearly is related to the pursuit of goals,
what distinguishes it from strategic action is its orientation towards not only goals
but also the cognitive frameworks within which goals are sought. Communicative
action can depict how actors can alter their goals and cognitive frameworks
by communicatively testing their validity. When an actor claims validity for a
statement of objective truth, subjective sincerity, or normative rightness, communicative action depicts how others can contest such claims. For instance, communicative action reconstructs how one set of actors can contest the rightness of a
second set’s goals. Should the second set’s goals conflict with the established
social norms of the community, then communicative action could lead to one of
at least three outcomes. The two sets of actors could reach an agreement whereby the second set replaces their goals with socially acceptable goals. Alternatively,
the actors could reach an agreement whereby the community’s norms are revised
to incorporate the second set’s previously unacceptable goals. Finally, the
communicative process could result in a communicative rupture between the
community and the second set of actors, leading the latter to engage the broader
community not communicatively but strategically, say through bargaining.
Third, both communicative action and strategic action presuppose a level of
reciprocal recognition on the part of the actors. Strategic action requires actors
to recognize each other as strategically competent and rational. Actors are not
objects or fixed parameters but are intentional, rational agents able to formulate
and pursue goals and to anticipate and react to the actions of others.10 Indeed,
strategic conflicts can be resolved through the achievement of such strategic
competence, for instance through strategies of instrumental reciprocity within
iterated prisoner dilemma interactions.11 Communicative action, however,
requires a more demanding level of reciprocal recognition: participants must
reciprocally recognize each other as communicatively competent actors, actors
who must receive justifications when they contest the claims of others and in turn
must provide justifications when their own claims are questioned. Thus, communicative reciprocity goes beyond the reciprocal recognition implied within strategic action. Communicative reciprocity recognizes actors with respect not only to
their ability to pursue goals and react to actions but also to their ability to communicate competently and defend their goals and perceptions through meaningful interpretations, reasons, and justifications. It presupposes either a common
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language or the ability to learn the language of the other, and it presupposes either
a common lifeworld of shared meanings that the actors wish to preserve or the
ability and willingness to understand the lifeworld of the other. In turn, such
communicative action presupposes a level of respect for the potential validity of
the claims raised by the other. While these claims can be tested, such testing must
begin with the prima facie acceptance that, in principle, these claims can be justified. Thus, the communicative recognition of the other obliges actors to be open
in two senses: to listen to the other, and to possess a moral personality that is
receptive to the other’s claims and criticisms.12
Finally, the importance of reciprocal communicative recognition is heightened
when we note that communicative action proceeds on two levels: unreflective communicative action depicts how actors coordinate goal-oriented action by drawing
on situation definitions or cultural meanings shared within a common lifeworld;
reflective communicative action arises when actors explicitly question lifeworld
meanings, as in the above case where actors question the validity of a community’s norms. This is the role of power-free discourse or argumentation. While
Habermas generally portrays reflective communication in terms of discourses that
challenge traditionally held norms or definitions within a single lifeworld, communicative action that occurs across lifeworlds must presumably also be reflective,
since meanings that are not shared cannot be unreflectively engaged.
Given this account, we must note that most theorists of inter-group communication tend to distance themselves from Habermas for at least three very good
reasons. First, Habermas does not himself develop an explicit theory of intercultural communication, and his theory of communicative action seems to presuppose that actors share a common lifeworld. Second, there are problems with
Habermas’s specific formulation of critical, reflective communication as embodied within power-free argumentation. Argumentation itself may function as a
form of power, since certain actors may be better equipped to engage in argumentative contests than others. In addition, argumentation poorly depicts the
deeply cooperative character of gaining understanding across cultures.13 Finally,
Habermas’s model of rational communication, in assessing the validity of statements via their claims to rightness, truth, or sincerity, contains important failings.
For instance, one can question the validity of the validity criteria themselves, since
goodness might be as acceptable a criterion of validity as rightness when dealing
with political questions.14 Nevertheless, I suggest that most models of intercultural dialogue, including the prominent models proposed by Charles Taylor,
James Tully, and Iris Young,15 do presuppose something like communicative
action, as opposed to strategic action. This presupposition emerges through their
reliance on an orientation towards understanding among dialogue participants,
the contention that dialogue is not an end in itself but a means for reaching collective agreements, a concern that dialogue be critical and reflective, and the
requirement that dialogue participants reciprocally recognize each other in a
manner that exceeds reciprocal strategic recognition.
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First, models of inter-group communication are oriented towards understanding. Tully draws on Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances in order to
depict how actors come to understand similarities between practices within their
own culture and practices within an alien one. Taylor uses Gadamer’s fusion of
horizons to portray how actors from one culture come to understand and evaluate the practices of another culture by immersing themselves in the other culture
and melding its standards of evaluation with one’s own. Young depicts ‘understanding across difference’ whereby actors listen in order to learn from the other
and correct possibly false beliefs about the other. In each case, inter-group communication requires an orientation towards understanding, not a strategic
orientation towards attaining goals by negotiating the reactions of the other. In
Young’s case, this holds even when full understanding cannot be achieved, a point
to be succeeded not by a strategic modus vivendi but by a stance of openness,
whereby actors recognize their ignorance and seek to learn from the other.16
Note, however, that such inter-group communication is not mere talk for the
sake of talk. For Tully, inter-group communication aims at mutually acceptable
practical agreements, whereby diverse cultural communities can live together
while pursuing the goal of preserving their distinct cultural practices. Taylor
incorporates the goal of cultural survival but adds the goal of finding evaluative
standards in order to determine whether there is truly something worth learning
from the other. Young views dialogue as the means of securing just and respectful relations among members of diverse groups through not only dialogue itself
but also specific policies and political institutions, which are justified precisely
because they enable actors to fulfil their subjective goals of self-determination and
self-development.17 For all three, inter-group communication is neither mere talk
nor strategic bargaining but a process of inter-group understanding aimed at
mutual acceptable agreements that allow for the resumed pursuit of individual or
collective goals.
Second, although none of the above theorists adopts Habermas’s model of
argumentative discourse, all implicitly presuppose that communication be reflective in two ways: it must be intentional and it must be potentially critical.
Communication aimed at understanding distinct cultural perspectives is intentional because actors cannot fall back on shared understandings as can actors
within a common lifeworld. Admittedly, Habermas’s argumentative model of
reflective communication is insufficient for depicting this task, since it does not
adequately portray how actors intentionally try to understand alien practices or
worldviews.
However, the critical character that Habermas identifies with reflective communication is perceptible within models of inter-group dialogue. Taylor holds
that inter-group communication should not uncritically affirm the practices of the
other, for to do so would ironically be disrespectful or ethnocentric. It would
be ethnocentric if actors implicitly affirm foreign practices by using their own
evaluative standards, thereby praising ‘the other for being like us’. It would be
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disrespectful if actors denied that any evaluative criteria existed, thereby reducing
judgement to simple statements of strategic allegiance. Young also implicitly
recognizes the role of criticism within inter-group dialogue, when actors criticize
how others misunderstand their perspectives. True understanding is achieved
only when actors can reach actual, partial agreements about cultural meanings
that can withstand potential criticism. Such understanding, in turn, is the ground
for mutual respect across difference. Even Tully, who most strongly rejects
Habermas’s disembodied portrait of critical reflection, nevertheless acknowledges
the role of criticism within intercultural dialogue.18 Thus, while Habermas’s
model of argumentative discourse may not suffice, inter-group dialogue does
require a reflective and critical form of communicative action.
Third, this reflective form of communicative action presumes a robust form of
reciprocal recognition. Taylor, Tully, and Young all place recognition at the
center of their models of inter-group dialogue, depicting it as extending moral
respect by being open to the other’s communicative contributions, not as the
recognition of the other’s strategic capacities to achieve goals. For Taylor, recognition and openness are manifest in the ‘presumption’ that any long-standing
cultural tradition potentially has something to teach others. This presumption of
potential value grants moral respect to the other by opening the door to potentially critical dialogue, whereas the uncritical ‘assumption’ of value at best grounds
strategic alliances. For Young, mutual recognition and openness enable moral
respect by checking one’s prior beliefs and realizing how the other is irreducibly
different from oneself.19 For Tully, mutual recognition is a necessary convention
for inter-group communication, since it allows actors to communicate in their
own ‘languages and customary ways’ and requires them to ‘change perspectives’
dialogically, by listening ‘to the different stories others tell’.20 In this sense, all
three models of inter-group dialogue presume a form of reciprocal recognition
among actors that reflects a communicative orientation towards understanding
beyond the reciprocal recognition of the other’s strategic capacities.
In viewing these models of inter-group dialogue through the lens of communicative action, I do not mean to dismiss how each one improves upon Habermas’s
own framework, which is clearly insufficient for grounding intercultural dialogue.
My present purpose in using communicative action is only to reveal the orientation presupposed within inter-group dialogue. Strategic action and purely artistic
communication for its own sake do not adequately portray the action within intergroup dialogue. Instead, communicative action oriented towards understanding
lies at the core.
That being said, what is omitted is an analysis of the conditions confronting
members of distinct groups who may wish to engage in such communicative
understanding. What prompts actors to adopt a communicative rather than a
strategic orientation towards members of other ethnic or cultural groups? What
prompts communicative reciprocity and its openness? More pertinently, what
prompts reflective communication, wherein members of different groups criticize
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practices or beliefs held by themselves or others? Some communicative theorists
turn to solidarity grounded in common or overlapping lifeworlds.21 As Habermas
puts it, ‘Communicative action is a switching station for the energies of social
solidarity’.22 If actors wish to preserve and strengthen lifeworld solidarity, they
should resolve their conflicts through communication. Yet amid cultural or
ethnic pluralism, the existence of a common lifeworld or the extent of overlap
among lifeworlds may come into question. Here, solidarity may be fragile and
tenuous. It might be threatened not only through the colonization of a lifeworld
by administrative or economic systems but also by strategic interactions among
groups with distinct lifeworlds or whose lifeworlds barely overlap. Indeed, while
communicative action under the guise of inter-group dialogue depicts a level of
social interaction that transcends strategic action, the danger exists that some
manifestations of strategic action may undermine the solidaristic basis for communicative action in plural societies.

The Strategic Logics of Group Conflict

164

It would be a gross mischaracterization to claim that strategic action among
groups necessarily leads to conflict. Strategic cooperation among groups is clearly possible and may even be the norm in plural societies.23 Nevertheless, strategic
action among groups can undermine the solidaristic basis for communicative
action among groups. For this reason, it is worth examining how the empirical
explanatory literature on ethnic and cultural pluralism identifies five strategic
logics of group conflict: the resource logic, the political logic, the information
logic, the positional logic, and the security logic.
The resource logic depicts how individuals strategically pursue external
resources, such as wealth and its sources, by identifying with certain groups.
Ethnic or cultural groups can effectively secure such resources, since they are
often pre-existing and need not be created anew by individual actors. Moreover,
such groups provide selective incentives, like group-specific cultural practices or
shared languages, which can encourage collective action on behalf of groups. In
this way, ethnic or cultural groups can function as particularly effective interest
groups.24
The related but distinct political logic portrays how political elites, such as
political party leaders or social movement entrepreneurs, strategically foster
group identification and mobilization in order to gain political power. The goal
of political power may be to distribute state-controlled resources disproportionately, although it may also involve symbolic goals associated with control of the
state.25 The political logic may manifest itself in at least three ways. First, within
plural democracies, it may take the form of electoral competition among ethnically based political parties. Here, violence is often associated with electoral campaigns.26 Second, the political logic may be based in ethnic social movements
working outside electoral processes to capture political power, either through
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secession or a coup. Finally, the political logic can also shape how political elites
bargain over alterations in political institutions, like electoral systems.27 In each
case, a common phenomenon is the flanking strategy. For instance, an exclusive
ethnic party may take a more extreme position along an ethnic political spectrum
in order to capture support from a more ethnically inclusive party, as characterized by political competition between the Hindu nationalist BJP versus the more
inclusive Congress Party in India. Alternatively, an extremist faction within a nonelectoral ethnic movement may outflank a more moderate wing, as often occurs
among splinter groups aligned with both Nationalist and Unionist movements in
Northern Ireland or among different factions within the Basque separatist movement in Spain.28
The political and resource logics share the characteristic that elites tend to
benefit disproportionately from group-based mobilization. Thus, empirical
accounts often draw on other strategic logics, like the positional logic and the
information logic, to explain why ordinary actors follow elites. The positional
logic holds that individuals defend the esteem of their personal or collective
identities by positioning themselves above the identities of others. For instance,
men may position their gender identity above that of women by attributing to
themselves greater levels of rationality, courage, and strength, while individuals of
European extraction may position themselves above those from Asia or Africa by
attributing to themselves traits of civility, culture, or refinement. The positional
logic predicts that, when one group perceives another group as threatening the
status of its identity, the threatened group will engage in economically irrational
violent behavior and develop a concomitant, emotive antipathy toward outgroups.29
The information logic suggests that elite and ordinary actors confront different
incentives regarding the acquisition and promulgation of information. On the one
hand, non-elite actors often confront high costs in acquiring accurate information. Thus, they may gain only relatively cheap information from elite group
leaders, group-specific media sources, or rumors.30 On the other hand, ethnic
elites have strong political and resource incentives to promulgate misleading but
cheap group-specific information, since they tend to benefit disproportionately
from group-based mobilization. As a result, ethnic elites have an incentive to
promulgate to non-elites group-specific information that may foster group conflict in various ways: out-groups may be falsely portrayed as a violent threat; the
economic benefits of group mobilization may be overstated; and myths and
stereotypes may strengthen positional relations among groups. For instance,
Indian political parties will often publicize instances of collective violence against
groups who constitute important vote banks, while overlooking similar incidents
against politically insignificant groups.31 Similarly, ethnic economic elites may
foster positional beliefs to undermine cross-group, working class alliances, as
occurred when white elites undermined cross-racial populism in the American
South.32 The information logic clarifies the divergent elite and non-elite strategic
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incentives to foster group mobilization, often in support of the resource or political logics.
Still, the presence of such strategic logics toward group mobilization need not
lead to actual violent conflict. Indeed, ethnic competition over resources or political power is often peaceful. The emergence of violent conflict usually involves the
initiation of the security logic in one of two ways. One the one hand, a breakdown
of the state’s coercive apparatus may create a quasi-Hobbesian state of nature,
wherein groups confront each other in a security dilemma. While peaceful interactions may be most beneficial for both, fear of the coercive capacity of the other
and the lack of a common police power may lead one group to take a pre-emptive
strike and initiate violent conflict. Russell Hardin believes that this accurately
describes the genesis of violence in the former Yugoslavia, where the death of
Tito and the economic crises of the late 1980s weakened the coercive, peacekeeping capacity of the Yugoslav state.33 On the other hand, the security logic can
also prompt violence without the complete breakdown of the state. This occurs
when some groups perceive, often correctly, that the coercive, peacekeeping
apparatus of the state – the police force – is not impartial in its treatment of
different groups. In this scenario, the disfavored group might choose between two
options: either it may take the law into its own hands by using non-state means of
coercive power, or it may follow the political logic to gain power over the state
and, in turn, the police. The former strategy was adopted by Nationalists in
Northern Ireland, whose peaceful civil rights movement turned to the IRA for
protection when it appeared that the Royal Ulster Constabulary was favoring
Protestants and indiscriminately attacking Catholics.34 The latter strategy has at
times been adopted by disfavored caste or religious groups in northern India, who
sometimes used their demographic strength to gain power over the government
and the police.35
The strategic logics of group conflict bear strong implications for communicative action across group boundaries. Even if violent group conflict is the exception
rather than the norm, the logics of group conflict can undermine the trust and
solidarity that ground communicative action across group boundaries. Moreover,
these logics of conflict are present not only in poor democracies, such as India, or
transitional societies, such as the former Yugoslavia, but also in established,
plural democracies, such as the United States. For instance, the resource logic
fostered violence between white and black workers during the early 20th century,
and continued to foster hostility and distrust among working-class Blacks,
Latinos, Asians, and Hasidic Jews in the 1990s.36 The security logic, via police
bias, may have fostered the 1965 Watts riot, the 1991 Crown Heights riot, and the
1992 Rodney King riots.37 The political logic, in turn, can be seen in the use of
racial stereotypes to gain political support in electoral campaigns.38 It also was
present in the political competition between Afro-Caribbeans and Lubavitcher
Jews for control of community boards in Brooklyn.39 The presence of these
logics within an established, plural democracy should prompt greater concern for
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communicative theorists. For while these theorists realistically restrict the domain
of reflective communicative action to established democracies with institutionalized communication rights and a modern moral and political culture,40 the logics
of group conflict within such a democracy can nevertheless undermine crossgroup communication. The fact that Bosnians negotiate with each other while
Quebecers talk to each other truly is not a trivial difference,41 but this difference
may get blurred when we examine interactions among working-class immigrant
groups in Brooklyn.42
To the extent that theorists of inter-group dialogue examine the logics of group
conflict, they tend to focus only on the positional logic, given its analogy to racial
prejudice. While this logic clearly can both promote violent conflict and undermine communicative action across groups, examining this logic without considering the others can lead to misleading results. For instance, Young attributes group
conflict in Yugoslavia to the positional logic, or ‘difference as otherness’. Yet
Young’s analysis fails to explain the genesis of this logic amid groups, which until
recently enjoyed relatively equal levels of social power and had a weak sense of
group identity.43 Hardin’s analysis of this case through recourse to the resource,
information, and security logics provides a more thorough and convincing
portrait.44 For this reason, normative theorists of inter-group dialogue should
more carefully examine how the various logics of group conflict may affect the
possibility of inter-group dialogue.

Communicative Motivations
The logics of group conflict provide strategic motivations that, even in the
absence of violent conflict, can hinder the robust inter-group dialogue advocated
by normative cultural pluralists. Still, one might argue that a strategic logic might
instead motivate dialogue, since the costs of conflict or potential conflict might
outweigh the costs of engaging in dialogue. While this often prompts some sort
of communicative process among groups, it is less clear that it can support the
robust dialogue associated with the intentional understanding and criticism of
goals, beliefs, or perceptions that is implicit in most normative models.45 Thus, we
should examine motivations that cohere with the communicative orientation
towards understanding that supports robust inter-group dialogue. In this vein,
theorists of communicative action suggest motivations related to moral–cognitive
consistency, normative characteristics of modernity, and publicity constraints.
Moral–cognitive consistency motivations compel a moral skeptic, who views
morality as relative to each individual, to engage in moral argumentation.46 These
motivations can be divided into three parts. First, a moral skeptic, as an observer
of moral phenomena, must admit that individuals are not thoroughly relativistic
but in fact demand justifications for morally questionable attitudes and actions.
Second, the skeptic could not consistently argue against the capacity to argue
rationally about morals, since arguing this point would involve the skeptic in a
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performative contradiction. Finally, the skeptic can deny the capacity to argue
about morality, while simultaneously avoiding a performative contradiction, only
by withdrawing from the community of moral arguers.47 Because communicative
action depicts intersubjective understanding through the possibility of contesting
claims to validity, consistency requires the skeptic either to accept the validity of
moral argument or to cease to belong to a community of communicative actors.
Given the character of inter-group dialogue and logics of group conflict,
moral–cognitive consistency motivations do not get us very far. They focus only
on the argumentative, critical aspect of reflective communicative action and fail
to address the non-argumentative form of reflective communication across
group boundaries that inter-group communication demands. Moreover, moral–
cognitive consistency motivations pertain only to those actors who have already
adopted a reflective level of communicative action, without clarifying what motivates actors to engage in reflective communicative action across group boundaries
in the first place. Most importantly, moral–cognitive consistency motivations fail
to address how the logics of group conflict can restrict reflective communicative
action across groups without restricting it within groups. Individual actors within
distinct ethnic or cultural groups can avoid the performative contradiction without denying all forms of reflective communicative action: they can merely restrict
their reflective communicative action to other actors within their own groups.
This coheres with the logics of group conflict, since it allows members of different cultural or ethnic groups to engage in unreflective and reflective communicative action within their own groups while acting strategically toward members of
other groups. To respond to this problem, communicative theorists must augment moral–cognitive consistency motivations with stronger ones that prompt
communication across group boundaries.
Normative characteristics of modernity may prompt communicative action
across group boundaries via a modern moral consciousness and the cultural selfunderstanding of a modern worldview. Modern moral consciousness upholds universality through recourse to an impartial, moral point of view, one that accepts
as legitimate only those norms that could be justifiable to all those affected by it.48
While the legitimacy of such norms can only be grounded through actual, inclusive dialogue, the impetus to dialogue comes from the moral consciousness that
such dialogue is needed. Thus, an impartial moral consciousness precedes dialogue
through a sense of moral empathy.49 While the problems with moral empathy
without actual dialogue are well documented,50 empathy may nevertheless remain
an important motivational basis for its own dialogical correction. However,
moral impartiality grounded in empathy itself derives from the cultural selfunderstandings of a modern worldview. A modern cultural worldview perceives
that the universalistic and impartial moral point of view is superior to other conceptions of morality that restrict rational, communicative justification only to a
select few, say a hierarchical caste or a specific cultural, ethnic, or religious group.
According to communicative theorists, the normative self-understanding of
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modern cultures requires them to reach out beyond their specific group and
attempt to include the other within the process of moral dialogue. Thus, actors
are motivated to justify their norms across group boundaries via the socialization
patterns, institutions, and political practices of various modern cultures.51
This set of motivations might prompt communicative action across group
boundaries, yet its strength depends upon the specific self-understanding of a
given modern culture. For instance, Rogers Smith notes that American political
culture has floated between more liberal-universalistic and more particularistic,
ascriptive self-understandings, the latter of which clearly coheres with the
positional logic of group conflict. He cautions Americans from thinking that
the former self-understanding would inevitably emerge victorious. Instead,
specific social and political constellations allowed the liberal–universalistic
self-understanding to emerge at certain times and the particularistic, ascriptive,
positional self-understanding to emerge at others.52 Thus, motivations based upon
the normative characteristics of modern cultures might themselves require motivational support through independent political or social factors.
Such indeterminacy also undermines motivations for cross-group communication through publicity constraints. The capacity of actors to win political debates
in the public domain is constrained by the audience addressed. Ideally, this audience will be unrestricted and will include members of multiple groups. Thus, if
actors put forth arguments that cannot appeal beyond one’s own particular group,
then their arguments are less likely to be accepted by the broader public. Such
publicity constraints could plausibly generate a process of public communication
that crosses group boundaries. However, the force of such publicity constraints
presupposes a public that is open to new perspectives, especially those that come
from previously silent or disadvantaged groups, and critically tests the contributions that enter its domain, in order to avoid dogma or ill-informed judgement.53
In light of the logics of group conflict, publicity constraints may have limited
motivating power. For instance, the positional logic could undermine the capacity
for disadvantaged groups to constrain public arguments. If these groups are seen
as inferior, their presence within an audience could nevertheless fail to constrain
public arguments. Furthermore, the information logic may undermine publicity
constraints by limiting the audience addressed by public actors. Since non-elite
actors may confront disincentives to gaining information, they may rely on cheap,
group-specific information sources. In turn, elite actors may experience strong
motivations, based on the resource or political logics, to provide misleading or
prejudicial information to members of their group. The result will be that public
actors will not be constrained by a large, inclusive, and diverse audience; instead,
they can cater to specific audiences populated by members of their own groups.
In this way, positional stereotypes and misleading information will go unchecked,
because members of other groups will not be included in the audience addressed.
This danger is especially relevant to the role of group-specific publics. Nancy
Fraser argues that such ‘subaltern publics’ help disadvantaged groups to commu-
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nicate more effectively and fairly within the broader public sphere. However, a
critic might fear that these may degenerate into segmented, group-specific media
markets susceptible to strategic manipulation by ethnic elites. Fraser is aware of
this problem and conceptually distinguishes inclusive, subaltern publics from
exclusive, subaltern enclaves.54 However, she does not provide an account for how
actors within subaltern publics are motivated to remain inclusive amid the information and positional logics of conflict.
Now, we must admit that communicative motivations are essential for reflective communicative action across group boundaries. It is probably unrealistic to
expect strategic motivations alone to generate the normative commitment to
reflective communicative action presupposed within models of inter-group dialogue. However, it is also unrealistic to assume that potentially reflective communicative actors are immune to the strategic logics of group conflict. In addition,
communicative motivations are depicted as broad motivators: their force works
gradually, through broad cultural developments and communicative processes.
While this is a realistic portrait, it fails to provide a more precise and fine-grained
understanding of how different actors face different constraints in engaging in
inter-group dialogue. For this reason, we should more carefully examine communicative action amid the logics of group conflict.

Communicative Action Amid the Logics of Group
Conflict: An Illustration

170

While communicative motivations alone may not be sufficient to overcome
strategic logics of group conflict, we must also realize that strategic logics need
not always foster group conflict and may even encourage communicative action
across group boundaries. Strategic logics can bear positive or negative consequences on inter-group dialogue, depending upon how they affect different
actors. The strategic logics of group conflict need not equally affect all actors
regarding their capacity to engage in inter-group dialogue. Strategic logics may
greatly affect some actors while having little bearing on others. Moreover, strategic logics need not uniformly affect actors. While some strategic logics will hinder
communicative action across group boundaries, others may actually aid it.
Recognizing these factors should enable a more fine-grained understanding of
which conditions enable certain actors to engage in inter-group dialogue.
An example of how the strategic logics of group conflict affect the capacity of
actors to engage in cross-group communicative action is given by the reception of
African-American civil rights within the Jewish-American public sphere from
1915 to 1935. This Jewish-American public sphere was anchored in Jewish labor
and cultural organizations and Yiddish and English language newspapers, primarily in northern American cities. While this public consisted of divergent
ideological perspectives, from socialist to conservative, its leadership clearly perceived itself as catering to a Jewish audience. For instance, the Yiddish press was
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accessible only to a Jewish clientele, while the English press perceived its role as
carrying specifically Jewish information overlooked by the mainstream press. Yet
despite this group-specific orientation, this public displayed the rudiments of
communicative action aimed at understanding the perspectives and concerns of
African Americans.
First, unlike many group-specific media sources, such as Hutu hate-radio in
Rwanda or Sinhalese newspapers in Sri Lanka, Jewish newspapers and organizations of this era did not simply concern themselves with mobilizing their own
group strategically to press their own interests. Instead, actors within this public
reached out beyond their narrow group concerns in order to engage AfricanAmerican perspectives. Jewish newspapers displayed an ongoing interest both in
the obstacles faced by African Americans and in their intellectual, artistic, and
political achievements. Journalists from Jewish newspapers reported on meetings
of African-American political organizations. In addition, leading AfricanAmerican intellectual and political leaders, such as the scholar-activist W.E.B.
DuBois and the labor leader A. Phillip Randolph, often addressed Jewish organizations. In this way, these civil society organizations arguably supported a groupspecific, universalistic subaltern public, as opposed to an exclusive enclave.55
Second, this communication was significantly reflective. This is especially clear
in its critical communication challenging the prevalent frameworks within which
race relations were conducted. Mainstream American culture was criticized for its
harsh, unjust treatment of African Americans, as was the positional belief of white
racial superiority. More strikingly, Jewish newspapers would often criticize antiblack racism among Jews themselves. This self-critical stance was maintained
amidst evidence of black anti-Semitism, and the Jewish press attempted to prevent
a Jewish backlash against such sentiments.56
Third, communication within this public aimed at recognizing African Americans as viable and competent communicative partners, although the quality of
such recognition is questionable. On the one hand, Jewish organizations invited
participation from African-American speakers, while Jewish newspapers clearly
recognized the moral and political status of African Americans as deserving of full
civil and political rights. Yet on the other hand, some Jewish figures may have
overemphasized their understanding of the African-American perspectives without recognizing what they did not know. This is clear in the tendency to portray
African Americans as America’s equivalent to the persecuted European Jew.
Indeed, although pre-discursive empathy may have prompted Jews, many of
whom had recently fled persecution in Europe, to open themselves to AfricanAmericans’ concerns, it ironically may have clouded their ability to understand
them clearly. For example, Jewish philanthropists advised blacks to adopt the
Jewish practice of creating separate, group-specific institutions like hospitals,
neglecting how African Americans might interpret this in light of legal segregation.57
Still, in comparison with the mainstream press and public culture of the time,
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the level of recognition accorded to African Americans was striking. Thus, it is
worth examining both how the Jewish public sphere adopted a communicative
orientation towards understanding across group boundaries and how certain
obstacles constrained it. Attention to the logics of group conflict may shed some
light on this issue. The key, I think, lies in the positional and security logics faced
by Jewish Americans. Importantly, these logics affected Jews differently in the
north and the south.
Regarding the positional logic, many northern Jews of this era did not feel fully
‘white’. The perception of permanent foreignness and the presence of broader
anti-Semitism hindered them from partaking in the positional logic that existed
between whites and blacks. Yet in important ways, this public sphere did interpret
Jewish identity in a positional manner that fostered positive relations with blacks.
The Jewish public sphere interpreted Jewish identity as negotiating a fine line
between assimilation into and rejection of the broader American culture. Having
fled persecution in Europe, most Jews wished to find a home in America and could
not reject its culture entirely. Nevertheless, most Jews were also afraid to lose
their distinct identity. Thus, they had to construct a culture within a culture. But
the interpretation of Jewish culture within this public sphere was strikingly positional. Jewish culture was perceived as morally superior to mainstream American
culture. Indeed, the Jewish press often attributed Jewish racism to the inculcation
of un-Jewish, mainstream ideas. By championing African-American causes, the
Jewish public sphere could proclaim the Jews as America’s ‘chosen people’, who
had understood and internalized American ideals of equality and justice more fully
than other Americans.58
This positional interpretation of Jewish identity in turn helped to shape the
northern Jewish perception of the security logic. Clearly, the resource logic
aggravated tensions between Jewish merchants and African-American workers,
and this sometimes led to security problems between these groups.59 But while
northern Jews were aware of this, they perceived a stronger security threat from
non-Jewish whites. Importantly, the 1915 Atlanta lynching of Leo Frank, a Jewish
businessman charged with raping a white woman, impressed upon northern
Jewish newspaper editors the common security threat that a partial, white
criminal justice system posed to both Jews and blacks. In this way, criticizing the
treatment of blacks by civil authorities could help Jews protect themselves from
similar abuse.60
However, the positional and security logics had significantly different effects on
southern Jews. Regarding the security logic, southern Jews’ geographic proximity
to the Frank trial and lynching may have intensified their perception of the
security threat. Leonard Dinnerstein notes that, when northern Jewish organizations attempted to aid in Frank’s legal defense, non-Jewish southerners reacted
with virulent anti-Semitism. This reaction led southern Jews to attempt to assimilate more deeply into the white, southern mainstream.61 A similar dynamic arose
during the Scottsboro trial, when nine African-American boys were prosecuted
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for allegedly raping two white women. While many northern Jewish individuals
and organizations strongly supported the boys, many southern Jews remained
wary. Indeed, when Rabbi Benjamin Goldstein of Montgomery publicly voiced
his support for the boys, his congregation forced him to resign.62 Dinnerstein
concludes that, while most southern Jews may have privately supported AfricanAmerican causes, the security logic forced them to remain publicly silent on
these issues and go along with the mainstream.63 In this case, the security logic
deformed publicity constraints, transforming this communicative motivation into
an obstacle hindering communicative action across group boundaries.
Whether or not through the security logic, several scholars also contend that
southern Jewish identity became submerged into the broader southern white
identity.64 Southern Jews may have been perceived merely as a distinct white
religious subgroup, whose social status would not have been significantly different from that of Presbyterians or Methodists in predominantly Baptist white communities. Alternatively, southern white ‘philo-Semitism’ may have helped to
incorporate southern Jews into the white mainstream.65 As a result, a distinct
southern Jewish identity was less able to support the moral, positional logic that
bolstered Jewish identification with African-American concerns in the north.
Instead, southern Jewish identity may have been submerged into the broader
white versus black positional logic. In this way, the positional and security logics
help to clarify why southern Jews tended to be less publicly supportive of AfricanAmerican civil rights than their northern co-religionists.
In examining this case, it is important to emphasize that there need not have
been anything intrinsic to Jewish identity that fostered these divergent regional
approaches to African-American issues. Indeed, present tensions belie any claim
to an essential, transcendent connection between these groups. Instead, I hope to
have clarified how strategic dynamics shaped the capacity for communicative
action’s orientation towards understanding across group boundaries. Moreover,
the strategic dynamics that led to regional discrepancies may also ground other
divergent attitudes. For instance, Michael Rogin uses the positional logic to argue
that many Jews within the entertainment sector sought to gain acceptance into the
white identity precisely by denigrating African Americans.66 Similarly, James
Glaser notes that older Jews tend to perceive themselves as an out-group in relation to mainstream white society and thus are more likely to empathize with and
support African-American civil rights issues. Younger Jews, however, tend to feel
more assimilated into white society. As a result, they possess a weaker sense of
out-group identity and extend less support to African-American concerns.67 Thus,
the development and the motivating power of a collective identity that crosses the
positional logic of group conflict is a contingent factor that may wax or wane,
depending on diverse social and political factors.
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Earlier, I argued that three theorists of inter-group dialogue presuppose the
orientation towards understanding found in communicative action. I also outlined
certain communicative motivations underlying the communicative action presupposed within inter-group dialogue. While communicative action and communicative motivations may be necessary for inter-group dialogue, my analysis of the
Jewish public sphere suggests that they are insufficient. By examining strategic
logics that affect inter-group dialogue, this case helps to realize two goals of this
article: first, to develop an analysis regarding the conditions of inter-group communicative action that was more fine-grained than general recommendations
regarding communicative motivations; and second, to clarify how specific strategic dynamics constrain and enable different actors in their capacities to engage in
communicative action across group boundaries. My analysis of the Jewish public
sphere also suggests that communicative motivations may sometimes undermine
communication across group boundaries. Consistent with Iris Young’s analysis,
moral empathy led some actors in the Jewish public sphere to overlook black
concerns about creating separate black institutions. In addition, the security logic
created publicity constraints that hindered southern Jews from adopting the
inclusive, communicative orientation towards black civil rights of their northern
co-religionists. While the problem of empathy may be corrected through intergroup dialogue itself, the latter problem of deformed publicity constraints might
not be similarly addressed.
This brings us to the third goal of this study: to prompt proponents of intergroup dialogue to think more strategically about how to foster inclusive communication across group boundaries. Specifically, theorists should give greater
thought to which actors, policies, and institutional reforms can best harness
strategic incentives to aid, rather than hinder, inter-group dialogue. In this
section, I will address this third goal through three recommendations for either
neutralizing the strategic logics of conflict or redirecting them in order to
encourage inter-group dialogue.
My first recommendation is to use the strategic logics of conflict in order to
identify which individuals or groups are best situated to engage in inter-group
dialogue. For example, the information logic is not always equally borne by all
actors in plural societies. Thomas Christiano notes that some actors, generally
middle- or upper-class white-collar workers, face fewer obstacles in gaining information.68 In a plural polity, these actors may be better able to gain viable information regarding the needs, interests, and perspectives of ethnic or cultural
groups other than their own. They also could more easily gain information
regarding common interests across group boundaries. This reasoning is illustrated by how activists in the American civil rights movement targeted their
actions towards elite ‘conscience constituencies’ who possessed greater capacities
to gain information.69
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The importance of circumventing the information, political, and economic
logics emerges among suggestions for post-conflict reconciliation in plural societies, which emphasize the role of ‘middle-level actors’, such as respected intellectuals or religious leaders. These actors are less constrained than the masses by
the information logic, while they are less constrained than businesspeople and
politicians by the resource and political logics.70 Thus, they may more easily gain
and disseminate information regarding the means and utility of mitigating group
conflict, in order to facilitate the communicative exchange of perspectives across
group boundaries. Still, the capacity of middle-level actors to foster reconciliation
depends upon whether they perceive themselves as transcending positional group
identities. If such actors perceive their identities as firmly entrenched within the
positional logic, then they may be more likely to use their capacity to acquire and
promulgate information to foster inter-group animosity. For example, some
Hindu intellectuals fostered anti-Muslim sentiments in India by providing misleading historical information regarding disputed religious sites, like the Babri
Masjid in Ayodhya.71 Thus, we should also examine which actors are most likely
to overcome the positional logic.
As the case of the Jewish public sphere suggests, not all group identities are
equally affected by the positional logic of conflict. Some group identities may
cross group boundaries so as to undermine positional conflict. Because gender
clearly crosses ethnic group boundaries, women can sometimes play a mediating
role in ethnically defined group conflict. Research shows that women are disproportionately represented within North American ‘anti-racist’ organizations.
Furthermore, white female anti-racists often experience double stigmatization, by
being either Jewish or lesbian. Because female, Jewish, and lesbian identities
tend to occupy a positional status that does not fully cohere with the positional
dynamic of white versus black, these actors are more likely to develop a level of
moral empathy regarding the harms inflicted upon racial minorities.72 In some
circumstances, purely ethnic identities can cross positional group boundaries.
In Nigeria in the late 1970s, the Yoruba were able to mediate Muslim–Christian
tensions over Sharia law, because their regional, ethnic identity crossed this
religious division. Note, however, that their ability to mediate conflicts on the
religious dimension would diminish regarding purely regional or ethnic tensions.73
The case of the Jewish public sphere, illustrates a further point for theorists to
recognize: inter-group dialogue may be more feasible where a society is divided
along multiple group divisions. Where a strong binary division separates two
groups, as exemplified by the strong, white–black division in the southern states
at that time, inter-group dialogue is less possible; where different divisions create
multiple, salient group identities, as existed in the northern states, inter-group
dialogue among two or more disadvantaged groups may be more feasible.
My second recommendation is to examine policies that, while not directly providing strategic incentives to engage in inter-group dialogue, at least mitigate
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strategic logics of conflict. For instance, Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein
provide evidence that membership in xenophobic or hate associations tends to be
drawn from working class individuals facing unemployment. Importantly, their
explanation marries the resource and positional logics: these workers confront not
only diminished material resources (which they perceive as caused by immigrants)
but also diminished social standing (which they seek to rectify by asserting their
superior ethnic status).74 Thus, improving the economic lot of such workers can
mitigate the resource and positional logics of conflict that hinder cross-group dialogue. Similarly, the security logic of conflict can diminish by reforming police
procedures or hiring practices to ensure the impartiality of these coercive forces.
Of course such policy reforms, while potentially neutralizing strategic logics of
conflict, do not directly harness strategic action to foster inter-group dialogue.
This task falls to the third recommendation: institutional reform.
Typically, civil society and the public sphere are identified as the home
for inter-group dialogue and communication. This makes sense in light of the
strategic logics of conflict, since civil society, when defined as a non-state, noneconomic sphere of voluntary and informational organizations,75 may insulate
actors from the political and resource logics of group conflict. For this reason,
Simone Chambers suggests that constitutional deliberations among Anglophone
and Francophone Canadian citizens more robustly upheld the demands of communicative action when they took place in the non-decision-making forums of
civil society.76 While this argument is cogent, it is perhaps one-sided, since noneconomic and non-state civil society actors do often play a role in fostering group
conflict by enhancing positional values and generating false information.77 Thus,
institutional reforms of the public sphere should seek to mitigate these logics of
conflict. For instance, taxation policies should grant exemptions only to those
associations that do not discriminate based upon race, ethnicity, or religion.78 In
addition, governments can provide financial or logistical support for associations
that intentionally foster inter-group communication, such as Catholic–Protestant
reconciliation groups in Northern Ireland or Black–Korean or Black–Latino associations in Los Angeles.79 Still, we must cede John Dryzek’s point that the ‘public
sphere is not a formal institution and so cannot be designed’.80 Consequently,
while policies may promote some types of civil society actors, constitutional rights
to freedom of association suggest that organizations fostering the positional logic
of conflict cannot be reformed away.
Thus institutional reform aimed at encouraging inter-group communication
should focus not only on civil society but also on the democratic state, specifically
its electoral systems. While normative theorists of pluralism have begun to
examine electoral systems, they have generally done so only with respect to
enhancing the descriptive representation of disadvantaged ethnic or racial groups.
However, as Donald Horowitz notes, certain electoral systems can counter the
political logic of conflict by providing strategic incentives for candidates to appeal
to voters across group boundaries.81 Such strategic incentives clearly affect the
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prospects for inter-group dialogue, since they present political candidates with
new publicity constraints: if a candidate is more likely to win by espousing positions that appeal across group boundaries, that candidate must communicate in an
inclusive manner and eschew ethnically exclusive appeals. In this way, electoral
systems serve the more ‘normative function’ of structuring ‘the boundaries of
“acceptable” political discourse’.82
Importantly, assessing electoral systems in light of their ability to counter the
political logic of conflict and to foster inter-group communication through more
inclusive publicity constraints leads to conclusions that conflict with those of
more purely normative theories. For instance, several theorists have followed
Lani Guinier in advocating the cumulative vote in order to enhance minority
representation.83 They do so because the cumulative vote, which grants voters a
number of votes equal to the number of seats in a multi-member district, enables
minorities to place all of their votes for a single candidate, presumably one of their
own race or ethnicity. But while the cumulative vote may assist minority voters
to elect a representative from their group, its incentive structure also can reward
ethnic extremist candidates who make exclusivist appeals. This differs from
preferential voting systems, like the alternative vote and the single transferable
vote, wherein voters rank candidates in preferential order. When a candidate
either wins or falls beneath a threshold, any excess ballots are transferred to the
candidates named as the second preference. Notably, candidates who gain few
first preference votes can nevertheless get elected through second preference
votes. Indeed, they can sometimes gain election over candidates who have many
more first preference ballots than they. As Horowitz notes, this characteristic can
provide an incentive for moderate candidates to appeal across group boundaries,
in order to maximize second preference votes.
Of course, electoral systems alone certainly cannot provide sufficient incentives
to motivate inter-group dialogue. Indeed, the presence of the single transferable
vote in Northern Ireland has not emancipated that society from the logics of
group conflict. However, we should also note that the replacement of the single
transferable vote with the single-member district plurality system in 1929
arguably enabled the political dominance of Unionist politicians until 1969, when
the political exclusion of Catholics exploded into the contemporary ‘troubles’. In
this sense, favorable electoral systems, like communicative motivations, are not
sufficient for mitigating the logics of group conflict or for enabling communicative action across group boundaries. However, along with institutional reforms in
the public sphere, policies aimed at mitigating the logics of group conflict, and
actors favorably positioned within the logics of group conflict, accommodative
electoral systems can be part of an environment conducive to inclusive communication. Communicative motivations, while absolutely necessary to realize the
potential of such an environment, are unlikely to suffice. Thus, normative theorists of inter-group dialogue must pay attention to strategic logics in order to
identify those actors, policies, and institutions that can realize the normative goals
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of inter-group dialogue. This may be a tall order, but justice among groups within a plural society may require it.
Notes
For reading and commenting on previous versions of this article, I wish to thank Marc
Belanger, James Johnson, Tony Massoud, John Peeler, Mark Warren, Stephen White,
Melissa Williams, Crawford Young, and the two anonymous reviewers for the European
Journal of Political Theory. All remaining errors are, of course, my own.
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